Lead

Nearly three years after the October 7, 2023, attack on southern Israel, newly revealed Hamas internal documents have shed light on the strategic deception that preceded the assault. The documents, provided by IDF intelligence to the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center and obtained exclusively by The Jerusalem Post, show, according to the center's analysis, a systematic effort to lull Israel into complacency before the surprise attack.

The files, which include a September 2022 document titled "Building a Strategic Deception Plan Which Will Be the Basis for a Surprise Attack by Hamas on Israel," outline a multi-disciplinary approach involving diplomatic, military, economic, and public relations elements. They also reveal Hamas's use of deceptive messages and its decision to stand down during conflicts with Palestinian Islamic Jihad to project a desire for calm.

The revelations have prompted introspection in Israel about how its intelligence apparatus read Hamas's intentions, as reflected in the Post's reporting.

Coverage Comparison

The Jerusalem Post, which had exclusive access to the documents, published multiple articles analyzing different aspects of the deception plan. The reports, authored by Yonah Jeremy Bob and the JPost Editorial, emphasize the systematic nature of Hamas's strategy and Israel's failure to anticipate it.

One report focuses on the documents' content, detailing how Hamas planned to use "calibrated border pressure, mediated demands, and the use of Jewish festivals as tactical opportunities." Another analysis highlights the progression of Hamas's plans from 2022 to 2023, showcasing the group's deliberate pacing and efforts to avoid detection.

A separate article covers the new exhibit at the Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (IICC), which houses authentic items from former Hamas Gaza chief Yahya Sinwar and other materials. The IICC, run by former IDF intelligence, Mossad, and Shin Bet officials, has been analyzing over one million physical Hamas internal documents and petabytes of data since the attack.

The coverage collectively paints a picture of a well-planned and patiently executed deception campaign, as reported by the Post.

Key Claims

  • Hamas studied Israel's management doctrine: According to the Meir Amit center's analysis, Hamas understood Israel's approach to Gaza as one of "management" — more work permits, more Qatari money, and indirect messages through mediators. Hamas used this understanding to its advantage, feeding Israel signals that aligned with its desire for quiet.
  • Use of Jewish festivals as tactical opportunities: A Hamas document from September 25, 2023, described the use of Jewish festivals as opportunities for surprise, indicating deliberate timing considerations.
  • Deceptive messages to Israel: The documents indicate that Hamas sent messages before the attack conveying a desire for calm and economic improvement, as part of its deception plan.
  • Standing down during conflicts with Palestinian Islamic Jihad: In earlier rounds of conflict, Hamas stayed on the sidelines, allowing Palestinian Islamic Jihad to engage Israel, which reinforced the perception that Hamas was seeking quiet.
  • Systematic deception plan: The documents outline a "strategic deception plan" with sections on military positioning, normalcy in drills, and summoning Nukhba Force fighters in ways to prevent Israel from identifying the moment of attack.
  • IICC analysis of internal documents: The Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center is analyzing over one million physical Hamas documents and petabytes of data, and has already issued reports on topics including Hamas's restored training in Shejaiya in early 2025.
  • Dual-hat operatives: Some Hamas operatives reportedly worked as UNRWA employees or journalists while participating in the attack, a claim based on internal documents and included in the IICC's research.