Russia-South Korea Trade Falls Sharply as Sanctions Bite, Ambassador Says

Bilateral Trade Halved Since 2022

Trade between Russia and South Korea has contracted sharply since 2022, according to Russian Ambassador Georgy Zinovyev. In an interview with Russia's state news agency TASS, he said bilateral trade turnover fell from $21.145 billion in 2022 to $10.939 billion in 2025, a near two-fold drop. Russian exports to South Korea declined from $14.817 billion to $6.895 billion over the same period.

Zinovyev attributed the decline directly to "anti-Russian sanctions by the collective West" and export control measures introduced by the South Korean government. He cited local customs data as the basis for these figures.

Persistent Trade in Key Commodities

Despite the overall downturn, certain Russian goods continue to flow to the South Korean market. The Ambassador said energy resources account for 50.6% of Russian supplies in monetary terms, with coal at 31.4% and liquefied natural gas at 18.7%. Metals and metal products make up 22.2%, and agricultural products 16.6%.

Russian aluminum exports to South Korea have not ceased and, according to Zinovyev, have actually increased since 2020. He said that in 2025, Russia exported aluminum worth $1.3 billion, totaling 483,000 tons. The Ambassador noted these shipments occur under long-term contracts between Russian and South Korean companies, and that local importers purchase aluminum on global exchanges based on production needs and market conditions.

Russian fish and seafood exports to South Korea also continue, with Zinovyev suggesting there is scope for expansion. He further indicated that South Korea's current economic conditions could open opportunities for new categories of Russian goods, including food products, construction and packaging materials, and pharmaceutical raw materials.

Shipbuilding Cooperation Frozen

One area where cooperation has been severely disrupted is shipbuilding. Zinovyev described Russian-South Korean shipbuilding cooperation as "strategic in nature," noting it was interrupted in 2022 when the South Korean side "was forced to withdraw from shipbuilding projects." He expressed regret that resuming cooperation — which he said would be "highly beneficial to both sides" — appears difficult under current conditions.

The Ambassador highlighted a notable legacy of this partnership: 15 Arctic-class ARC7 gas carriers built at South Korean shipyards for the Yamal LNG project. These vessels currently transport liquefied natural gas produced in Russia's Arctic zone. Additionally, he mentioned that practical cooperation had been established with emphasis on localizing technology and production at the Zvezda shipbuilding complex in Russia's Primorsky Region.

Prospects for Normalization

Looking ahead, Zinovyev said the normalization of relations with Seoul is possible and perhaps more likely than with most other countries deemed hostile by Moscow. He referenced statements by Russian President Vladimir Putin during a January 15 Kremlin ceremony where credentials were presented by foreign ambassadors, including South Korean Ambassador Lee Seok-bae. Putin said at that time that Moscow "counts on restoring relations" with Seoul.

The Ambassador acknowledged that South Korea, having joined the Western sanctions campaign, has since 2022 imposed export controls on a wide range of goods to Russia. He noted that the country's new leadership has not yet eased these restrictions but also has refrained from introducing new ones. "Under such circumstances, certain opportunities remain for developing practical ties, albeit within fairly tight limits," he said. "A return of relations to a path of normalization is a matter for the future."

Perspectives

Russian Official Viewpoint

The Russian ambassador presents the trade decline as the direct result of Western sanctions and South Korean export controls, while emphasizing that certain trade sectors remain resilient and that dialogue continues.

Potential South Korean Viewpoint

While not directly quoted in the source materials, South Korea's actions reflect a balancing act between participating in Western-led sanctions and maintaining economic ties where legally permissible, as evidenced by continued purchases of Russian aluminum and energy imports.

Analysis

The figures cited are consistent with broader trends of reduced Russia-South Korea trade following 2022, though independent verification of the customs data would be needed for full confirmation. The future trajectory will depend on geopolitical developments and sanctions policy adjustments.