China’s growing North Africa presence a structural challenge for Europe

Lead

China's investments in North Africa have intensified in 2026, building on long-standing Belt and Road Initiative frameworks while accelerating amid the US-Israeli war with Iran, according to the South China Morning Post. With 40-50 per cent of China's seaborne oil imports traditionally passing through the Strait of Hormuz, which is now blocked to most container traffic, Beijing has sought to diversify energy sources away from Gulf Arab states.

The South China Morning Post reports that the war in Iran and the ensuing closure of the Strait of Hormuz have exposed the risks of over-reliance on the Persian Gulf for oil, turning Beijing's Mediterranean infrastructure plans from long-term goals into urgent strategic necessities. From Algerian oilfields to Moroccan battery factories and Egypt's industrial base, China might now fast-track these projects to create a Mediterranean hub for a green-energy supply chain, observers said.

Coverage Comparison

Both reports from the South China Morning Post emphasize China's strategic motivations in North Africa, though with slightly different angles. One report focuses on the intensified scale and urgency of China's activities in 2026, driven by geopolitical instability in the Gulf. The other highlights the transformation of long-term plans into urgent necessities following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Both are consistent in attributing China's moves to energy security concerns and the need to diversify away from Gulf Arab states.

Key Claims

China's economic engagement in North Africa is driven by three main pillars: energy security, infrastructure development, and industrial expansion. In 2026, all three have intensified, according to the South China Morning Post.

Algeria has become increasingly important as a supplier of oil and natural gas, leveraging its Opec status and stability for China's diversification. Chinese state-owned enterprises have expanded into upstream investments, participating in pipeline and liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects. For example, a 2025 agreement between Algerian oil and gas firm Sonatrach and China's Sinopec has expanded into shale gas exploration on the 36,000 sq km Guern El Guessa II block, aligning with Beijing's upstream energy push. Chinese firms have received an estimated US$70 billion in Algerian contracts in the past two decades, as reported by the South China Morning Post.

At the same time, China is not solely focused on hydrocarbons. Renewable energy has emerged as a major area of cooperation, particularly in Morocco. For instance, several recent deals there added green aluminium, solar, and wind production through large Chinese state-owned power companies, according to the South China Morning Post.

In Algeria, a major Belt and Road Initiative partner with one of Africa's biggest Chinese expatriate communities, Chinese state-owned firms manage multibillion-dollar infrastructure and energy portfolios. These include a long-standing production-sharing partnership between Sonatrach and Sinopec, as well as the US$437 million naphtha processing unit at the Arzew refinery in the country's northwest, as detailed in the South China Morning Post report.

Up the coast, the proposed US$4.7 billion El Hamdania megaport in Cherchell, originally developed by China State Construction Engineering and China Harbour, is meant to anchor Beijing's maritime strategy in the Maghreb, the report adds.

Beijing aims to create a strategic backup that protects its economy from future energy disruptions, according to observers cited by the South China Morning Post. Africa-wide engagement in China's infrastructure initiative hit US$61.2 billion in 2025, the report notes, underscoring the scale of China's involvement on the continent.

Perspectives

Analysts cited by the South China Morning Post view China's moves as a structural challenge for Europe. The development of a Mediterranean hub for green-energy supply chains could reduce Europe's historical economic leverage in North Africa while increasing China's foothold in a region traditionally within Europe's sphere of influence. The reports do not include direct European responses, but the framing suggests that European policymakers may need to recalibrate their strategies in the Maghreb as China deepens its presence.

From a Chinese perspective, the intensified engagement is presented as a rational response to global energy vulnerabilities. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the ongoing conflict in the Gulf have made diversification a strategic necessity. By investing in Algeria's hydrocarbons and Morocco's renewables, China aims to secure energy supplies and build infrastructure corridors linking Asia to Europe and Africa, as part of its broader Belt and Road Initiative.

No dissenting voices or European objections are included in the provided reports. The narrative is consistent in portraying China's actions as calculated and driven by security concerns, with no suggestion of internal Chinese debate or external criticism.